Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

3-1-2011

State Cooperation & the International Criminal
Court: A Role for the United States?
Beth Van Schaack
Santa Clara University, bvanschaack@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Beth Van Schaack, State Cooperation & the International Criminal Court: A Role for the United States? (2011),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/614

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

State Cooperation & The International Criminal Court: A Role for the United States?
Beth Van Schaack1

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is almost entirely dependent on State cooperation
to effectuate its mandate to bring to justice individuals responsible for committing ―the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.‖2 State cooperation is also
central to the evolving relationship between the ICC and the United States.3 President Barack
Obama entered office with a pledge to temper the prior administration‘s hostility toward the ICC.
Since then, he has been conducting a high-level review of U.S. policy toward the ICC.4 Although
no official position has been announced, subsequent public statements by Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, Ambassador-atLarge for War Crimes Issues Stephen J. Rapp, and Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh have
confirmed that the United States stands ready to re-engage with the Court. Notwithstanding this
rapprochement, domestic legislation dating from the Bush Administration prohibits most forms
of cooperation with the Court absent specific waivers or other contingencies. If the United States
is to best position itself to use all international tools available to it to advance United States
interests in responding effectively to the commission of international crimes, this legislation
should be repealed or significantly scaled back. Short of ratifying the ICC Statute, there are a
number of ways that the United States can work with the Court to both promote the United
States‘ foreign policy agenda and support the mission of the Court. Re-engaging with the Court
through appropriate cooperative efforts will go far toward restoring the United States to its prior
leadership position in the arena of international justice.
State Cooperation and International Justice
Fully effectuating a system of international justice depends on the involvement and
cooperation of States, regional organizations, and the United Nations. International tribunals can
assert jurisdiction over only a limited number of cases, so domestic courts must bear the primary
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Where international
tribunals do assert jurisdiction, they are dependent on the assistance and support of States. This
assistance can come in many forms, including the arrest and surrender of the accused; public
outreach; diplomacy; procuring evidence; the identification, tracing, and freezing of assets; the
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relocation of victims and witnesses; the provision of security, logistical, and operational support
in country; the accommodation and transport of court personnel and defense counsel; sanctioning
uncooperative States; and enforcement of orders for interim release and sentencing judgments.
The experience of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere
reveals that the execution of arrest warrants is the most critical form of cooperation; this is
already proving to be true in the ICC context as well.5
Notwithstanding U.N. Charter or treaty-based obligations to cooperate on the part of
target and other States, the original ad hoc tribunals have struggled to gain full and effective
cooperation. As subsidiary organs of the Security Council enjoying a Chapter VII provenance,
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (the ICTY and
ICTR) have been able to call on the Security Council in the event that State cooperation from
target States was not forthcoming. Nonetheless, the Council‘s response to such non-compliance
was often less than robust; as such, the tribunals have struggled to fulfill their mandates in the
face of State recalcitrance. This was especially true for Serbia, and to a lesser extent, Rwanda
and Croatia. Other ad hoc tribunals have either been part of United Nations transitional
administrations (as with the Special Panels for East Timor or the Kosovo Special Panels) or the
subject of an agreement with the host State (as with the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). These features have also facilitated
cooperation to a certain extent. Nonetheless, target and other States have harbored fugitives,
refused to turn over evidence relevant to ongoing prosecutions, or simply failed to put their
muscle behind judicial directives.
The United States, along with other States, has over the years rendered a range of formal
and informal assistance to the ad hoc tribunals. In addition to supplying technical assistance and
seconding personnel, the United States has utilized diplomatic and economic sanctions, frozen
assets, shared evidence, offered rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of
indictees, and authorized and participated in multilateral military efforts to track and apprehend
suspects.6 As such, the United States has extensive experience using its intelligence capabilities,
criminal justice expertise, and military muscle to further international justice. Even as a nonState party, the United States is poised to continue to play this role vis-à-vis the ICC in light of
the détente between the United States and the Court.7 Aspects of domestic law, however, render
a whole range of forms of assistance potentially unlawful.
5
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State Cooperation and the International Criminal Court
Lacking its own enforcement mechanism, the ICC is entirely dependent on States and
other entities to carry out many of its core functions. As former ICC President Philippe Kirsch
has noted, ―Like any judicial system, the ICC system is based on two pillars. The Court is one
pillar, the judicial pillar. The operational pillar belongs to States, international organizations, and
civil society.‖8 Part nine of the ICC Statute is devoted to the issue of State cooperation. Article
88 specifically obliges States Parties to alter their domestic legal arrangements in connection
with ratification of the treaty.9 In particular, States Parties are to ensure that their domestic legal
arrangements enable them to render a number of forms of cooperation, including the arrest and
transfer of suspects, the freezing of assets, the protection of victims and witnesses, and the
procuring of documentary and testimonial evidence (see Articles 86-93). In the event of noncompliance, the Court can refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the
Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council (Article 87(7)). These
obligations are subject to exceptions yet to be tested in situations in which the disclosure of
information would threaten national security, as determined by the State itself in consultation
with the Court (Article 72). In addition, the Court can provide assistance to States Parties
investigating and prosecuting ICC crimes pursuant to Article 93(10). States parties are to execute
requests for assistance in accordance with their relevant domestic procedures pursuant to Article
99(1), although domestic law may not be invoked to deny cooperation per Article 93(3). In the
event of noncompliance, the Assembly of States Parties likely cannot do much more than make a
finding to this effect. In the event that the Council refers a situation, it can utilize its Charterbased enforcement powers to gain State cooperation, but it may be unable or reluctant to invoke
this power to the fullest extent, as has been seen in the Darfur context.
Article 87(5) of the ICC Statute also envisions that the Court might invite assistance from
non-States Parties, such as the United States and two other permanent members of the Security
Council that have yet to join the Court: China and the Russian Federation. Non-States Parties are
welcome to enter into cooperative arrangements with the Court on an ad hoc basis. If these nonState Parties fail to cooperate, they too can be forwarded to the Assembly of States Parties, or the
Security Council in the event of a Council referral. The public record reveals that at least one
formal request for assistance from the ICC to the United States is outstanding with respect to the
situation in Darfur.10 Since President Obama took office, United States personnel have been in
regular contact with high-level Court personnel, so no doubt other forms of potential assistance
have been discussed.
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The issue of State cooperation was central to the stocktaking component of the 2010
Kampala Review Conference.11 States Parties adopted a number of declarations reinforcing the
importance of, while also identifying the challenges to, effective and comprehensive State
cooperation.12 In addition, States issued dozens of pledges, committing themselves to
cooperating with the Court. The United States pledged as follows:
1.

2.

The United States renews its commitment to support rule-of-law and capacity
building projects which will enhance States‘ ability to hold accountable those
responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
The United States reaffirms President Obama‘s recognition on May 25, 2010 that we
must renew our commitments and strengthen our capabilities to protect and assist
civilians caught in the [Lord‘s Resistance Army‘s] wake, to receive those that
surrender, and to support efforts to bring the LRA leadership to justice.13

As the only non-State Party to make such a pledge, the United States received tremendous
positive feedback from the ICC‘s Assembly of States Parties. It also signaled its support for the
Ugandan prosecutions, which focus on crimes committed by the Lord‘s Resistance Army.
U.S. Cooperation with the Court
Even if the United States was so inclined, the it is barred from providing many forms of
cooperation to the Court by the American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA).14
The ASPA—enacted a month after the Rome Treaty entered into force—is a product of the
initial hostility of the Bush Administration toward the Court15 as symbolized by the May 6, 2002
retraction of the United States‘ signature on the Rome Treaty. At that time of the signing of the
Rome Treaty in 2000, President Clinton did not recommend that his successor submit the Treaty
to the Senate for advice and consent until the United States‘ fundamental concerns were
addressed, most notably the ability of the Court via an unaccountable prosecutor to exercise
11
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jurisdiction over the nationals of non-states parties. The retraction of this signature was
accomplished by a letter from John Bolton when he was President George W. Bush‘s
Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, to Kofi Annan, then SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.16 This indication of an intent not to ratify the treaty removed any
obligation of the United States to refrain from acting contrary to the object and purpose of the
treaty, as required by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states:
―A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a
party to the treaty.‖
The American Servicemembers Protection Act contains a number of provisions geared
toward limiting both U.S. involvement with the Court and the exposure of U.S. or allied citizens
to prosecution before the Court. For example, members of the U.S. Armed Forces are prohibited
from participating in any UN peacekeeping force or UN peace enforcement operation unless
permanently exempted from prosecution.17 This prohibition is subject to a presidential waiver so
long as notice is given to the appropriate congressional committee, U.S. nationals are exempt
from prosecution, and target countries are either not parties to the ICC Statute or have entered
into agreements not to extradite (or otherwise transfer or surrender) U.S. citizens to the Court.
The United States succeeded in getting the Security Council to issue a number of resolutions to
temporarily protect U.S. citizens from prosecution in regions where the United States has
deployed troops.18
In its original incarnation, other aspects of the ASPA were geared toward intimidating
potential ICC States Parties by threatening to withhold various forms of international aid—
including military assistance in the form of International Military Education and Training
(IMET) and Foreign Military Funds (FMF)—unless they agreed not to transfer U.S. citizens to
the Court.19 In 2004, the Nethercutt Amendment to an appropriations act added economic aid to
the types of foreign assistance subject to suspension.20 These so-called Economic Support Funds
(ESF) include funds for promoting antiterrorism and security operations, anti-corruption efforts,
economic and democratic development, human rights, and peace processes. Together, these
pieces of legislation provided that aid could continue so long as one of three contingencies was
in place: (1) the country entered into an agreement insulating United States nationals from the
16
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Court; (2) the President waived this sanction in the national interest; or (3) the country was a
NATO member, a non-NATO ally (such as Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina,
the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand), or Taiwan. All of these sanctions were subject to
exceptions and additional waivers.
The Bush Administration used the coercive provisions in the ASPA to extract a number
of bilateral treaties with States in which parties pledged not to refer each other‘s nationals to the
Court without the consent of the State of nationality. Human rights NGOs deemed these
agreements ―bilateral immunity agreements‖ (BIAs). The United States claimed authority for
such agreements in Article 98 of the ICC Statute, which bars the Court from proceeding with ―a
request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international law‖ regarding diplomatic immunity or its obligations
under ―international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court.‖21 At the moment, over 100 such agreements—
terminable at will by either party—remain in force, although it appears that the United States has
not entered into an Article 98 agreement since its 2007 agreement with Montenegro.22 President
Bush granted a number of waivers to strategic States (some in connection with Operation
Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom), but suspended various forms of assistance to over thirty
States Parties to the ICC.23 Not surprisingly, this strong-arm approach had negative
repercussions24 insofar as it antagonized our allies, alienated States subject to sanctions, angered
the human rights community,25 and enabled other States to step into the void in foreign
assistance, especially in Latin America.26 The European Parliament, for example, issued a
resolution condemning the ASPA and calling upon the United States to participate in the
common endeavor of the international community to bring tyrants to trial.27 The European Union
21

Article 98 was likely drafted with Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements in mind. Kimberly Prost &
Angelika Schlunck, Article 98: Cooperation With Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1131, 1131 (Otto Triffterer, ed.,
1999).
22
See Georgetown Law Library, International Criminal Court—Article 98 Agreements Research Guide,
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm.
23
See Congressional Research Service, International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues 6
(May 18, 2009) (discussing sanctions and waivers), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128346.pdf.
24
See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy Toward the International
Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 415, 418 (2004) (arguing that ―the United States‘ over-reliance on ‗hard
power‘ to alter the ICC‘s constitutional framework has diminished its ability to achieve its goals, on a more
sustainable basis, through persuasion. Resentment of aggressive U.S. tactics aimed at securing an ironclad
exemption from ICC jurisdiction has radiated across other arenas of national concern, impairing the United States‘
ability to secure support for other policy objectives‖).
25
See, e.g., Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: U.S. Efforts to Obtain Impunity for Genocide,
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, IOR 40/025/2002 (Sept. 1, 2002) (arguing that Article 98 agreements
violate the Rome Statute and urging countries not to enter into these agreements with the United States), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/025/2002.
26
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by U.S. officials).
27
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originally issued ―guiding principles‖ limiting the degree to which its members could enter into
Article 98 agreements with the United States, but ultimately granted its members permission to
enter into such agreements so long as only American military personnel and diplomats were
exempt from prosecution.28 Although the United States has not entered into any new Article 98
in recent years, the Obama Administration has yet to indicate that it does not intend to enforce
these agreements or use these or other means to discourage additional States from joining the
Court.
The Bush Administration‘s second term witnessed a moderation of the relationship with
the Court. In keeping with this evolution, the ASPA‘s punitive provisions began to see
significant dismantling, by either congressional repeal or non-renewal, starting in 2006.29 This
change of policy reflected the fact that the withholding or complete denial of foreign aid proved
to be counter-productive and contrary to United States‘ interests, particularly in a postSeptember 11th era when military and other forms of foreign assistance had become central to the
United States‘ anti-terrorism agenda. Members of the Department of Defense testified publicly
that such agreements reduced troop training opportunities and hindered the United States‘ ability
to fight terrorism abroad.30 Indeed, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in 2006 that
adhering to some provisions of the ASPA was akin to ―shooting ourselves in the foot.‖31
Although the ASPA has largely been declawed, other aspects of the legislation remain in
full force.32 Most importantly for the question of State cooperation, the ASPA continues to
prohibit many forms of cooperation with the Court by U.S. courts, state or local government
entities, and in some cases federal agencies and personnel.33 Forms of prohibited cooperation
include transmitting letters rogatory, aiding in the investigation or transfer of any U.S. citizen or
permanent resident to the Court, using appropriated funds to assist the Court, and assisting in the
extradition of any person to the Court.34 An earlier piece of legislation prohibits any appropriated
funds from being used to support the ICC.35 Treaties of mutual assistance are to be interpreted to
comply with the ASPA.36 No agent of the ICC may conduct any investigative activity in the
United States (§ 7423(h)), and no U.S. court or state or local governmental entity may respond to

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&FILE=020704&LANGUE=EN&TPV=DEF
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See European Union, Guiding Principles Concerning Arrangements between a State Party to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court and the United States Regarding the Conditions to Surrender of Persons to the
Court (Sept. 30, 2002), 42 ILM 240, 241 (2003).
29
Most importantly, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 eliminated restrictions on military assistance
for states that refuse to sign Article 98 agreements with the United States. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1212, 122 Stat. 3,
371 (2008).
30
Id.
31
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, Trip Briefing: En Route to San Juan, Puerto Rico (Mar. 10, 2006) (on
file with the U.S. Department of State), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63001.htm.
32
This includes the radical provision that the United States can use ―all means necessary and appropriate‖ to bring
about the release of any U.S. citizen detained or imprisoned by the Court—the so-called ―Invade the Hague‖
provision (22 U.S.C. § 7427 (2010)).
33
22 U.S.C. §§ 7423-7425.
34
Id. at §§ 7423(b)-(f).
35
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-133, § 705 (2000-2001).
36
22 U.S.C. § 7423(g).
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requests for cooperation from the Court.37 Even information sharing is prohibited; the President
must ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to prevent the direct or indirect transfer of
not only classified national security information, but also any law enforcement information to the
Court or to a party to the ICC Statute.38 In addition, the legislation bars U.S. government entities
from providing any support to the Court.39 ―Support‖ is broadly defined in the legislation as
―assistance of any kind, including financial support, transfer of property or other material
support, services, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, the training or detail of
personnel, and the arrest or detention of individuals‖.40 These limitations do not apply to actions
taken by the President pursuant to his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or
in the exercise of executive power.41 The result of these provisions is that the Court is deprived
not only of U.S. support and assistance, but also of U.S. training and expertise.
The President is entitled to waive the provisions barring cooperation and the transfer of
information to the Court.42 This waiver is allowed where the investigation or prosecution is
within the United States‘ national interest and the suspect is not a ―covered‖ U.S. person or allied
person, such as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, an elected or appointed member of the U.S.
government, any other person working on behalf of the U.S. government, or military or other
personnel of NATO member countries and major non-NATO allies so long as that government is
not a party to the ICC.
Notwithstanding all these particular limitations, the statute also provides that the United
States is not prohibited from participating in international efforts to bring to justice certain
foreign nationals (including Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milošević, and
members of al Qaeda) and ―other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes
against humanity,‖ thanks to an amendment proposed by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT).43 It
is unclear to what extent the Dodd Amendment trumps other more restrictive elements of this
legislation.44 Unofficially, it has been suggested that the Office of Legal Counsel produced a
memorandum suggesting that the Dodd Amendment might allow for the provision of certain
forms of case-by-case, in-kind, and facilitative assistance to the Court without breaching ASPA.
Moreover, there are some contributions the United States can make to situations under
37
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latitude on Darfur.
Clint Williamson, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Century Foundation on Reassessing the International
Criminal Court: Ten Years Past Rome 10 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
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consideration in the Court that likely do not run afoul of ASPA. For example, the United States
can assist in international justice efforts by encouraging and enabling positive complementarity
in national systems. Indeed, in Kampala, the United States hosted an important side event on
positive complementarity in the Democratic Republic of Congo—one of the countries with cases
before the ICC.45 The United States can also likely assist in witness protection and relocation
efforts so long as no funds are provided directly to the Court. Likewise, it can condition aid to
countries that are in a position to assist with arrests, such as Kenya, which has already played
host to President Omar Al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the ICC.
Cooperation and the Obama Administration
As a non-State party, the United States is under no legal obligation to cooperate with the
ICC, although there may be some customary law obligations not to actively hinder
accountability for international crimes.47 Nonetheless, there have already been situations in
which cooperation with the Court as a matter of policy will advance U.S. foreign relations and
other interests. The 2005 Darfur referral by the Security Council, which the United States
allowed, has already demonstrated that ICC action can be consistent with United States foreign
policy. No doubt, capturing Joseph Kony and his indicted LRA henchmen is also within the
strategic interests of the United States.48 Notwithstanding that the United States and the Court are
enjoying a détente, it is exceedingly difficult for the United States to render much meaningful
broad-based assistance to the ICC without running afoul of the ASPA, notwithstanding that the
Dodd amendment may provide some cover in this regard on a case-by-case basis.49 Given that
the coercive aspects of the American Servicemembers Protection Act are no longer in force,
repealing, scaling back, or mitigating the anti-cooperation aspects of the ASPA should be a high
priority for the Obama Administration.
46

To enable increased cooperation with the Court, President Obama could effectuate casespecific waivers within the ASPA to the maximum extent possible. In addition, the United States
can take steps to dismantle the Article 98 agreements, if only by indicating that it does not intend
45

See Press Briefing, supra note ___ (noting the role that the United States can play in promoting and assisting
national-level prosecutions).
46
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
principle: ―a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.‖
47
See G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9326 (1973), available at
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/281/46/IMG/NR028146.pdf (―8. States shall not take any
legislative or other measures which may be prejudicial to the international obligations they have assumed in regard
to the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.‖).
48
On May 24, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Lord‘s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern
Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, which aims to ―support stabilization and lasting peace in northern Uganda and areas
affected by the Lord‘s Resistance Army through development of a regional strategy to support multilateral efforts to
successfully protect civilians and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord‘s Resistance Army and to authorize funds
for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice, and for other purposes.‖ Lord‘s
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-172, 124 Stat. 1209
(2010).
49
The United States did facilitate the surrender of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to the ICC by enabling the lifting of
Security Council travel restrictions and sanctions. See Judge Philippe Kirsch, Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/53692E4E-2B35-41BD-8B9091828D55880A/278543/PK_20061009_en.pdf.
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to enforce them or seek additional such protections in the future from other members, or
potential members, of the Court. That said, a more thorough legislative reform agenda targeted at
the ASPA‘s anti-cooperation provisions is necessary to enable a ―more systemic and
institutionalized program of cooperation with or support of the Court‖50 Beyond what the Dodd
amendment may allow with respect to particular cases. These more broad-based changes would
enable the United States greater flexibility in providing cooperation where the ICC‘s
investigations and prosecutions are consistent with its interests and in engaging in long-term
cooperative activities and building institutional ties with the Court.
Short of total repeal of the ASPA, Congress could be encouraged to make surgical
amendments to the legislative scheme to curtail its over-broad elements. The most effectual fix
would be the repeal of § 7423 of the ASPA, which prohibits a number of forms of cooperation
and support. This would enable the United States to choose from a range of ways to cooperate
with the Court—entirely at its discretion and when it is in its interests to do so. Congress could
also tinker with specific parts of § 7423. In particular, the limitations on cooperating with ICC
investigations or transferring suspects to the Court could be removed in the case of non-U.S.
nationals (so-called covered allied persons in § 7432(3)) and—more controversially—in the
cases of individuals who are not members of the U.S. armed forces or elected/appointed
government officials (i.e., ―other persons employed by or working on behalf of the United States
Government‖ (§7432 (4)). ―Support‖ could be more narrowly defined to exclude only financial
support and thus allow for the provision of in-kind assistance, such as training, intelligence or
collaboration in law enforcement (§7432(12)). The 2001 Foreign Relations Authorization Act
could be repealed or amended to be consistent with the terms of ASPA, since it may be
interpreted as even broader than the provisions of ASPA preventing the provision of support for
the Court. Congress could also permit the ICC to conduct investigations within the United States
(§ 7423(h)). Similarly, Congress at a minimum could redraft § 7425 to allow for the sharing of
law enforcement information for the purpose of facilitating the investigation of ICC crimes, the
apprehension of fugitives, and the prosecution of defendants. The ban on the sharing of classified
information could remain in place subject to the waiver provisions. Finally, the various waiver
provisions in § 7422(c) could be liberalized. A risk inherent to seeking legislative reform is that
it may result in the return of ASPA‘s more restrictive provisions, or a weakening of the modus
vivendi provided by the Dodd Amendment, so the timing of any such effort should be carefully
considered to ensure Congress‘s receptivity to cooperating with the Court.
Conclusion
The total ban on U.S. cooperation with the ICC contained within the ASPA hampers the
ability of the United States to advance U.S. interests in accountability where they dovetail with
situations under investigation by the Court. It also leaves the ICC without U.S. expertise in
intelligence and law enforcement. By effectuating modest amendments to the ASPA, the United
States can remain a non-State party and still provide cooperation and other forms of support
where consistent with United States interests. This mutually beneficial relationship will
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ASIL Policy Paper, supra note ___, at 33. Models include the cooperation agreements between the United States
and the ICTY and ICTR.
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ultimately enhance international justice efforts and restore the United States to a leadership
position in this arena.
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